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The Chicken, the Factory Farm and the Supermarket: the Emergence of the Modern 
Poultry Industry in Britain
1 
Andrew C. Godley and Bridget Williams 
 
“Rationing and price control of feeding stuffs ends on August 1
st”, declared the lead 
article of the British trade journal, Poultry Farmer, on March 14
th, 1953. A revolution 
in modern British agriculture was to follow, with the poultry industry utterly 
transformed through intensive rearing and factory farming. The resulting cheap 
chicken meat led to a revolution in the British diet. In 1950 British households 
consumed only around 1 million chickens. But by the mid-1960s, like many other 
things in the country, meat-eating habits were transformed. Over 150 million chickens 
were sold for consumption in 1965, over 200 million by 1967. If the postwar decades 
of the 1950s and 1960s saw a transformation in British society, its revolutionaries 
sustained themselves with mouthfuls of roast chicken. 
 
This article describes how the modern poultry industry emerged in Britain principally 
through initiatives from food retailers. It is this that distinguishes the British case from 
parallel developments in U.S., where there was also a great expansion in poultry 
production and consumption. As in the U.S., entrepreneurial poultry farmers 
collaborated with pharmaceutical and animal feeds companies, with food retailers and 
refrigeration unit manufacturers, and together they conducted a wholly novel 
experiment in the organisation of agriculture. But at the forefront of the emergence of 
modern poultry farming in the U.S. was the active and interventionist hand of 
government through the United States Department of Agriculture. In Britain the role 
of innovator and co-ordinator fell to a small group of entrepreneurial poultry farmers .  3




I. The American Origins of the Broiler Chicken Industry  
Chicken meat had long been eaten throughout most of the world, but never as a staple. 
In the 1920s chicken was code for an enticing luxury in America, with Herbert 
Hoover’s 1928 electoral slogan, “A chicken in every pot” victoriously aimed at 
aspirational voters at the end of the Roaring Twenties. But it was there that the 
transition from occasional luxury to everyday staple occurred first.  
 
Initially only one section of America’s heterogeneous population saw chicken as a 
staple, America’s Jews. New York City, with almost three-quarters of America’s first 
and second generation immigrant Jews, was the largest Jewish city in the world. It 
represented the largest and most concentrated urban demand for chicken meat 
anywhere in the early twentieth century.
2  
 
Kashrut restrictions on slaughtering methods meant that Jewish demand was for live 
chickens, and from the mid-1920s these were increasingly reared in the Delmarva 
peninsula, between the Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean.
3 While chicken 
production there in the 1930s grew, the industry remained small overall. It wasn’t 
until Jewish demand could be met with pre-slaughtered chicken that the scale of 
chicken production was transformed; the first processing stations opening in 
Delmarva in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Production capacity then mushroomed, 
so prices fell and producers began targeting the Gentile market. With its longstanding .  4
preference for the American method of dry frying, or broiling, this gave the emerging 
industry its name.
4 A massive increase in demand followed, first during the war and 
then especially afterwards. Per capita consumption of chicken in the United States 
increased from 5lb in 1945 to over 28lbs in 1961. The American broiler chicken 
industry emerged as the first modern “agribusiness”.
5 
 
Despite its parochial ethnic origins in serving the specialist needs of the Jewish 
community, the industry’s transformation was no accident. First, in the 1920s 
chemists at the University of Wisconsin realized that supplementing chicken feed with 
synthetic Vitamin D enabled poultry flocks to be better managed and the laying 
season extended.
6 This coincided with a United States Department of Agriculture 
initiative (in conjunction with its Co-operative Extension Service, attached to the 
Land Grant colleges) to encourage those farmers badly hit by disease in the 1920s to 
switch to broilers.
7 Research at the Land Grant colleges further focused on mineral 
and vitamin feed supplements to boost growth, although the next chemical 
breakthroughs came from the leading pharmaceuticals companies like Merck.
8 By the 
early 1950s U.S. feedstuffs producers were supplementing with a melee of vitamins, 
coccidiostats and antibiotics their maize, soya bean and feather meal high-energy 
feed, with the result that poultry growth rates jumped.
9 
 
Some breeds of chicken grew quicker than others. Poultry farmers rapidly converged 
on one strain, the White Cornish stock developed by Charles Vantress growing from 
12 per cent to 76 per cent of the Delmarva commercial broiler population from 1953 
to 1957, for instance.
10 As the conditions for the mass production of chicken meat 
were increasingly ripe, Americans increasingly ate a single, standardized chicken .  5
product. Within a decade – from the late 1940s to the late 1950s -- the American 
broiler chicken industry had expanded enormously and begun to move away from its 
Delmarva peninsula heartland, with former tobacco and cotton farmers elsewhere 
turning to poultry production. Arkansas quickly developed into a major centre of 
production. But such rapid growth in the industry led to overproduction, price falls 
and industry reorganisation. Poultry farmers with anything less than deep pockets 
were forced to withdraw, or to become contract farmers working for the big feedstuffs 
companies (like Ralston Purina) or hatcheries (like Perdue in the Delmarva peninsula) 
that integrated forwards into chicken rearing, or for the distributors, like Tyson, that 
integrated backwards from trucking in Arkansas.
11 During the 1950s, in other words, 
American poultry farming was evolving into a major industry, applying the latest 
technology in production, processing and distribution.  
 
 
II. Innovation and Growth in British Poultry Farming 
British poultry farming began the 1950s far, far behind the U.S. industry in 
techniques, efficiency and scale, partly, as the Poultry Farmer headline indicated, 
because of restrictive Government practices. Yet – unusually for British industry – the 
poultry sector rapidly caught up with, and even overtook, American practice in the 
second half of the 1950s, to a large extent because the different institutional structure 
in British poultry farming encouraged better co-ordination between the principal 
parties during the industry’s formative years.
12  
 
Before the war Britain’s 50 million or so poultry flock was reared for their egg 
production.
13 Eggs had become a staple in the British diet before 1914, most .  6
obviously in their derivative form in cakes and biscuits, confectionary and drinks, but 
some were also eaten fresh.
14 Most were imported from Ireland, Denmark, France and 
Austria, as well as Poland, Russia and even Egypt. Frozen and dried eggs came 
increasingly from as far afield as China.
15 But the British poultry population expanded 
during the 1930s as demand for fresh eggs grew. The flocks were small, typically only 
around 200-400 birds, and were fed off farmyard scraps. The eggs were collected by 
one of Britain’s 616 approved local packing stations, where they were boxed up and 
sent on.
16 It was a seasonal activity, with hens laying in the lighter summer months, 
and so could only ever be a sideline to the main farm business. Egg laying was mostly 




Significant or not, an egg-producing industry needed chickens, for a hen’s productive 
life lasted around two years. And while there were some small commercial hatcheries, 
most egg-laying flocks reproduced themselves. This inevitably led to the production 
of surplus cockerel chicks all around the country. It was these young cockerel chicks 
(males) that supplied the early demand for small “roasters”. The older “spent”, or 
redundant, layers were mostly only fit for the pot.
18 Apart from some imports from 
chicken farms in Hungary, Lithuania and Russia, the chicken supplied to British 
households in the 1940s was overwhelmingly a by-product of these egg-laying 
flocks.
19 They were mostly sold in local markets or through small, independent egg 
and poultry retailers. But demand was growing in the 1940s and 1950s. For one thing, 
chicken was left off the postwar British rationing system, and so a genuine market 
emerged. A few regional grocery chains that had sold poultry before the war also .  7




III. The Co-ordination Problem and the Development of the British Poultry Industry. 
The very early entrepreneurial poultry farmers were attempting to introduce 
techniques already developed in the United States. Whether it was increasing flock 
size in ever larger sheds, augmenting feed with evermore sophisticated supplements, 
or improved processing methods, knowledge flowed eastwards across the Atlantic.
20 
But the British environment was different to the United States in two critical ways.  
 
First the role of Government differed. The United States Department of Agriculture 
had long established its preference for direct intervention into the U.S. agricultural 
sector. With successive British Governments embarking on a path of economic 
planning and control after the war, agricultural activities in Britain were also were 
severely impinged by regulation. The more entrepreneurial of the poultry farmers 
became intensely frustrated at official restrictions on their growing businesses. Under 
the 1950 Diseases of Animals Act Vantress chickens could not be imported, for 
example, so ensuring British chicken farmers were less productive than American. To 
compound matters, official attempts to improve the domestic broiler stock were too 
slow. Entrepreneurs resorted to smuggling in fertilised Cornish Rock eggs from the 
U.S. Antony Fisher, the founder of the leading producer Buxted Chickens, brought 
two dozen back in his hand luggage disguised as Easter Eggs. But an additional 
impact of the Act was to bar imports of cheap American chicken meat, and so to offer 
protection to the infant British poultry industry.
21 This encapsulates the difference in .  8
the two Governments’ approaches to intervention. The USDA took responsibility for 
re-organising the U.S. agricultural sector, commissioning research and disseminating 
information on new feed innovations, farming practices, and on how the industry 
should be structured. The British Government had no truck with such prescriptive 
practices. Rather its philosophy was to control the market (through veterinary 
regulation, price-controls or import restrictions), but otherwise not intruding on actual 
farming practices.  
 
Secondly, British food retailing, and poultry retailing in particular, was seemingly far 
more concentrated than the United States, enabling a few leading retailers to exert 
more control over the emerging industry than was the case in the U.S. This needs 
some explanation, for while there were many thousands of small, independent poultry 
stores in Britain in the 1930s, the trade “disappeared” during the war.
22 By the early 
1950s only a dozen or so chains dominated the re-emerging trade. The Unilever 
subsidiary MacFisheries and the regional grocer J. Sainsbury were the most important 
by far.
23 With the continued uncertainty over import restrictions in the postwar years, 
and the expected growth in consumer demand for chicken, these leading retailers 
wanted to encourage greater quantity and better quality from domestic suppliers. 
Sainsbury’s had already invested in its British supply lines with a longstanding 
trading relationship with Lloyd Maunder, a meat supplier based in Tiverton, Devon, 
and had even established its own poultry farm and processing plants in East Anglia. 
Sainsbury wanted to extend such collaborative supply arrangements to other leading 
poultry producers.
24 
 .  9
It wasn’t that American food retailers ignored chicken producers. Horowitz mentions 
the East Coast retailer A&P as one retailer that was involved with the Delmarva 
producers, for example.
25 But the leading retailers in Britain were able to exercise far 
more influence over their supply lines because they handled proportionately a much 
greater share of the total poultry trade. Sainsbury’s, the market leader, reckoned on 
having around fifteen percent of the total market. With far more stores than 
Sainsbury’s, MacFisheries could not have been far behind. Add in several of the other 
strong regional grocers, and the nascent poultry industry was dominated by perhaps 
less than a dozen retailers.
26 
 
Retailers were therefore able to exert far more control over the industry than in the 
United States, and it was these retailers, not the Ministry of Agriculture (the British 
equivalent of the USDA), who pressed British poultry farmers to follow American 
methods, exploit economies of scale and so drive down the price of chicken. The net 
result was that British retailers not only possessed more market power than their 
American counterparts, but they did not have to compete with an assertive state 
agency in efforts to restructure and co-ordinate poultry production. They nevertheless 
shared a similar goal to the USDA, wanting to create a mass market for chicken. In 
Britain this proved problematic, for despite its privileged position off the meat ration, 
chicken in Britain was firmly identified as a luxury in the mid-1950s, and it came with 
a price to match.  
 
 
IV. Self-service-inspired retailer intervention in British Poultry production .  10
The consensus view in the early 1950s was that chicken remained too expensive in 
Britain to compete effectively with alternative meats. The price had to fall before a 
significant market could emerge. Retailers took the initiative and introduced the 
principal pricing innovations in the early years of the industry’s development. Most 
obviously they insisted on smaller birds that cost less to rear, so they could be priced 
more attractively. Price was far more important than size, as Max Justice, Sainsbury’s 
manager of the Poultry, Game and Rabbit Department, explained in his keynote 
speech to the inaugural broiler industry conference in October 1955, saying that a 
“very substantial market for broilers can be developed if it is possible continuously to 
offer a bird of about 3lb cleaned, plucked weight for 10s [$1.40] retail”.
27   
 
Retailers then began to reduce their range of offerings to just three grades of chicken: 
small chickens (very young birds at 1lb to 1½lb weight), roasters (up to 3lb and 
selling at the 10s price point) and boilers.
28 “Standardization is long overdue”, 
claimed Poultry Farmer in late 1954 “and until we have got some common basis on 
which to compare one bird with another, the whole business of buying table poultry is 




As retailers began to influence both the size and permitted rearing costs, so pressure 
was increasingly brought to bear on the palatability and presentation of the chicken 
meat. Alan Sainsbury (Executive Director and Chairman of the family firm) insisted 
on buying white-fleshed birds, claiming that (and in contrast to prevailing tastes in the 
U.S.) “yellow-fleshed birds are not popular” with consumers. “Put yellow and white-
fleshed birds side by side and you can be sure the yellow will be left to the last.” .  11
Sainsbury also became active in breed selection, collaborating with commercial 
hatcheries and sponsoring the competitions in the first official broiler tests in 1959.
30 
Retailers also dropped the word “broiler”. It had been imported from the United States 
along with the industry, but British cooking habits didn’t include broiling. The term 




These few retailers were so interventionist because it was they who were at the 
forefront of adopting the self-service format during these years, and none more so 
than Sainsbury. From the second half of the 1950s onwards, Sainsbury was 
aggressively moving away from its traditional counter service format and 
incorporating a self-service format with greater shelf and refrigerator space than its 
peers. Before the war Sainsbury had sold a huge variety of poultry and game in large 
quantities, and senior management wanted to continue with this trade. But the new 
format could no longer tolerate such a range and variety of products. Increased 
standardization from its suppliers was now paramount, prompting the retailer to 
become far more instrumental in managing its supply chain. 
 
Sainsbury was already active in communicating novel farming techniques to its 
suppliers. Sainsbury’s Max Justice told John Maunder (who had taken on the poultry 
business in the family firm) of advanced U.S. techniques in 1956, for instance, a 
conversation which ultimately precipitated a total transformation of rearing methods 
in Devon.
32 But the introduction of self-service was to take the rate of retailer-led 
change in the organisation of the industry to a new level. 
 .  12
Self-service was, of course, another American invention being introduced somewhat 
haphazardly and experimentally into the UK by several pioneers.
33 It was understood 
partly to be a solution to the growing difficulty in recruiting skilled labour for the 
grocer’s traditional counter service functions. Self service’s real benefit, however, was 
the format’s impact on the productivity of scarce retail space. Sales per square foot 
could potentially increase, as backroom preparation and storage space was converted 
into selling space. For most of the early experiments with the self-service format this 
meant following more or less exactly the American model of restricting the number of 
lines available in supermarkets to non-perishable packaged goods. 
34 
 
Unlike Tesco, Fine Fare and other self-service pioneers, Sainsbury was already 
committed to perishables, especially poultry. But poultry presented something of a 
dilemma for a nascent self-service operator. It required both specific skills for 
preparation (drawing and trussing) and refrigerated storage space. Poultry was, in fact, 
so difficult to handle that butchers did not even sell it, preferring instead to 
concentrate on red meats, which required both less cold-storage and could cope with 
more robust handling than poultry.
35 Harold Temperton, Director of the National 
Institute of Poultry Husbandry at Harper Adams agricultural college, castigated 
butchers’ conventional approach to poultry. “Undoubtedly the good work of the 
poultry farmer was frequently spoiled by crude methods of dressing, evisceration and 
presentation of many butchers.”
36 
 
Poultry was, in fact, an ideal product for a labour-intensive, high-service quality retail 
format like Sainsbury’s traditional counter service operation. But Sainsbury had 
committed itself to pursue expansion in self-service. It was because, uniquely among .  13
British food retailers, it wanted both to continue serving its large existing market for 
poultry and to incorporate more self-service features in its stores that it became the 
driving force behind the transformation of intensive rearing and factory processing of 
poultry in Britain. As Giles Emerson summarises in his recent history of the company, 
“Sainsbury’s was once again pioneers [sic]… [in the] product innovation stimulated 
by self service… the introduction of “ready-to-cook” frozen chickens.”
37  
 
Frozen chickens sold in self-service supermarkets differed in one crucial respect from 
their forebears sold in the traditional counter-service stores. Without either the space 
for preparation or even the skills among branch staff, evisceration had to take place at 
the packing station rather than in the store. This was to have enormous implications 
for the processing side of the industry, because chicken meat deteriorated very rapidly 
after evisceration unless it was kept under refrigerated conditions. 
 
Even before adding evisceration to processing operations, pressure from retailers had 
begun to transform Britain’s packing stations. The retailers’ demand for 
standardization of chicken sizes in the mid-1950s had a dramatic impact on the most 
labour intensive element of the poultry industry, slaughtering and processing, 
Standardizing bird sizes encouraged introduction of specialized machinery and 




Packing stations that wanted to supply supermarkets with eviscerated chicken from 
the late 1950s onwards had to go further and completely refigure their production 
methods in order to address the greater perishability of eviscerated chicken. They .  14
especially had to make substantial new investment in refrigeration and hygiene. For 
companies like Buxted, able to make the additional investment, the gains were soon 
apparent. Writing his annual survey in Poultry Farmer and Packer, Tony Pendry, 
Buxted’s Managing Director (and Antony Fisher’s right-hand man), emphasised that 
“1959 has seen the opening of two or three very large broiler packing stations.” Over 
half of the entire trade now went through just four processing stations.
39 One of those 
large packing stations was Buxted’s new Aldershot “poultry factory”, “with 80 people 
turning 30,000 pre-packed and frozen oven-ready birds a week”, and planning to 
reach a throughput of 150,000 birds a week by 1961. With its conveyor-driven, 
automated processing system and quick-freezing plant in four enormous blast tunnels 
capable of freezing 1,800 birds an hour, semi-automatic packaging machinery and 
shrink-wrapping, this new factory cost £250,000. It was probably the most advanced 
processing plant in the world, seemingly ahead of practice in the U.S. poultry 
industry.
40 The company was appealing for producers capable of producing batches of 
not less than 5,000 birds at a time. It was a far cry from traditional poultry farming 
and those flocks of 200 to 400 birds.
41  
 
The self-service imperative for off-site evisceration inevitably therefore led to 
increased capital intensity, specifically in refrigeration. And not just in processing 
stations. All the way along the supply chain from slaughtering to sale, eviscerated 
poultry needed to be kept cold. “The temperature… must be reduced quickly to below 
zero Fahrenheit and held at this until a few hours before the bird is put into the oven.  
This means some formidable problems for distribution and the expense of such 
distribution must be charged to the product. Much so-called quick frozen poultry is 
badly trussed, low frozen and just pushed into a cellulose film bag, and after a few .  15
days’ handling the bag bursts and the bird then begins to develop freezer burn, which 
means the flavour is lost” explained Poultry Farmer in 1958.
42  
 
The demand for refrigeration units in trucks and vans grew, with Imperial Chemical 
Industries emerging as the country’s leading supplier.
43 The need for refrigeration at 
the point of sale of course became paramount, and so an unintended consequence of 
the self-service format’s imperative need to push non-display activities up the supply 
chain was to give those retailers with large existing investments in expensive 
refrigeration units a strong competitive advantage in selling chicken.
44  Indeed, even 
among the supermarket pioneers only Sainsbury’s, MacFisheries and the much 
smaller Waitrose had made the necessary investments. By the mid-1950s Sainsbury 
typically installed up to two dozen refrigerators in each of its new self-service stores. 
Its Chief Electrical Engineer reported that, “Some idea of the load required at 
Lewisham can be given by the fact that it is practically double that required by the 
Lewisham Gaumont Cinema and had our building not been well advanced, the 
[electricity] supply company would have insisted on the construction of a sub-station 
to take this load.” MacFisheries was also rolling out refrigeration-intensive, self-
service format stores across the north of England.
45  
 
Other grocers, even those developing self-service formats, like the Allied Suppliers 
group (the Unilever subsidiary incorporating the Liptons, Home and Colonial and 
other brands), the Co-operative Retail Service (CRS), Fine Fare and Tesco, lay far 
behind the leaders in refrigeration capacity, preferring instead in their self-service 
experiments to follow the US self service archetype more exactly and focus on 
building up sales of non-perishables. 
46 Of course the U.S. self service model was also .  16
changing, and by the late-1950s chicken was increasingly distributed via self-service 
stores. In 1959 Denby Wilkinson claimed that “help-yourself stores handle 60%” of 
American poultry output. But the chicken retailed in the U.S. differed crucially from 
the British product, distributed chilled not frozen and wrapped by the retailers in their 
central warehouses, not at the packing stations. By 1960 the British and American 





 V. Retailer as Industry Co-ordinator 
The net effect of continual innovation in the British poultry industry in the ten years 
after the decontrol of feedstuffs was of a technological revolution in intensive rearing 
methods among farmers, the adoption of factory processing at packing stations and 
the creation of a market for a slightly different product than in the U.S. – the frozen 
chicken. These retailer-led influences were to have a dramatic impact on the speed 
with which the poultry industry developed in Britain and the organisational structure 
it adopted. The reduction in the size of the bird from a 4½lb to 5lb bird to a 3lb bird 
reduced the growing cycle from 12 to 10 weeks (and with later improvements in 
feedstuffs to nine weeks), meaning farmers were able to move from three harvests per 
year to four, and then to five. The productivity of farm space rocketed.
48  
 
But it was the remarkable increase in the capital intensity in processing that forced the 
leading firms to invest heavily or lose out. Processors increasingly contracted out 
chicken rearing itself. Despite such precipitate change in firms like Buxted Chickens .  17
and Lloyd Maunder, investments followed a careful sequence of discussion and 
agreement with the leading retailers.  
 
While retailers were eager to consult with producers on product quality and price, 
they were quickly dragged into the industry’s re-organisation because of one 
important consequence of the drive to expand rearing. As the economies of scale 
began to be exploited and flock sizes rose from the hundreds to the thousands, so 
retailers became increasingly agitated over fluctuations in supply.  In the United 
States as the industry spread, it was plagued by periods of glut, before price falls 
subsequently led to producers exiting and so to undersupply. Such volatility hampered 
the industry’s ability to market the product.
49 But the much smaller number of 
retailers in Britain exerted far more control over the supply chain than was possible in 
the United States to co-ordinate production cycles. They needed to, because they 
depended on “regularity in supplies,… steady prices to the consumer… [and] 




However, volatility in supply was difficult to eradicate because of the increase in 
batch size as chicken flocks grew. With the early producers rearing a flock of, say, 
1,000 or more chickens over a 10 to 12 week season, the aim was to slaughter and 
distribute the entire flock of chickens as soon as they reached the target weight. The 
costs of two or three additional days of feeding could eliminate the farmers’ profit 
margin. As flock sizes increased into the tens of thousands, the risks multiplied. So 
the leading growers began to contract directly with supermarket retailers in advance 
of the chickens even hatching, in order to reduce the risk of too many flocks being .  18
brought to market simultaneously.
51 In 1958 according to Poultry Farmer and Packer, 
“the chief development… has been the rise of the ‘group system’”, where farmers had 
fixed contracts with packing stations, which in turn had fixed contracts with retailers, 
enabling the market to be co-ordinated.
52  
 
Leading retailers precipitated the development of the contract raising system, in 
particular Sainsbury. Alan Sainsbury had been very involved in the wartime controls 
of food production and distribution, which revolved around the zoning of supply, 
eliminating competition, but enforcing co-operative behaviour. They sought to adapt 
wartime practices for the fully competitive markets of the mid-1950s. John Maunder 
recalled being summoned to Max Justice’s office in London in 1956 along with a few 
other pioneer poultry processors, and told by the Sainsbury representative that   
“we’re going to organise the country into sectors. And Maunder, you can have 
the West Country, and Antony Fisher you can have the South-east,… And we 
just sat there and took this as our marching orders.  We were basically told, 
and ‘Go home and organise it.’  We had nothing more than that to go on.  We 
literally had to go back and organise it.”
53 
 
Maunder, Buxted and the others then recruited farmers to supply them, and they in 
turn then had the processors as guaranteed outlets. It was not straightforward, but the 
“group system” spread. 
 
John Maunder later recollected that “you had to go out and literally persuade farmers 
to invest in chicken houses, at a time when it was a relatively unknown and unproven 
thing.  It gathered momentum, of course, in a matter of a strikingly short period of .  19
time – only a couple of years.  Farmers talked amongst themselves and we virtually 
had to do very little selling of the idea because it was an attractive commercial 
proposition at that time.  In those early stages it was very novel.  And to get a farmer 
to actually understand the fact that he had to put these day-old chicks in when we 
wanted them put in, because it had to be on a programmed output.”
54 
 
The system guaranteed revenues to its privileged insiders, which in turn facilitated 
their commitment to a very high level of capital expenditure in what were still quite 
small firms. Buxted worked very closely with Sainsbury’s as it embarked on its major 
expansion of processing facilities, for example. Perhaps unsurprisingly, “Sainsbury’s 
became by far their biggest and best customer.”
55 The lead-suppliers collaborated 
among themselves, facing little incentive to compete once inside the Sainsbury 
“sector system”, sharing knowledge about how to obtain the best supplies.
56 It was a 
system that constrained competitive forces, and so indeed privileged insiders, but at 
the enormous benefit of increasing the returns to investment in new facilities, in what 
was inevitably a highly volatile trade.
57 It was a form of collaboration that echoes 
contemporaneous developments in the U.S., but which remained significantly 
different. For there it was farmers and feed companies, prompted by the USDA, that 
integrated forwards. Retailers, and initially processors, were omitted from the 
standard integrated U.S. poultry business. Processors indeed continued to buy their 
meat at auctions until recently, prompting incredulity from their British colleagues.
58  
 
In Britain, as the scale of rearing and processing increased, and as the quality or 
product was increasingly assured, so did incentives to firms to incorporate multiple 
stages of poultry production. A few processors with close relationships to the .  20
dominant retailers initiated this process. By the early 1960s the leading processors had 
integrated backwards beyond rearing and into commercial hatcheries, and then 
developed close ties with feedstuffs producers. Buxted, for instance, sold a ten percent 
block of shares to Spillers (a leading British feed manufacturer) in October 1961. 
After its flotation in 1963, a controlling stake was subsequently acquired by Nitrovit, 
the Yorkshire-based feedstuffs company, in February 1964, which also then sought to 
create a wholly integrated business, “from a day old chick to the shop counter.”
59  
 
In 1963, after only ten years of development, Geoffrey Sykes was able to characterise 
the British poultry industry as being composed of a handful of large, fully integrated 
units, where minimum efficient scale of output was 5 million broilers per annum. 
“From the stage of hatching-egg production to processing, the cost of this chain of 
enterprises exceeds £1½ million. The organisation behind the achievement of putting 
a chicken weighing 2½ lb ready-to-cook in the shops at 7/6d to 10/-”.
60 
 
Well before then, by the end of 1958, the British poultry industry was claiming to 
have reached the American industry at the technological frontier of poultry 
production, in terms of both the rate of growth and the efficiency of processing.
61  
Maunder and his fellow integrated processors would “all… make fairly regular trips 
to the States. The realization that we all came to was that in fact the only benefit that 
they [the U.S. producers] brought to this whole scene was the genetic benefit. We 
rapidly overtook them in almost every other sphere, and we would go there and we 
would say ‘Yes, very interesting, but…’ In most areas they were behind us… So we 
were always interested in what they we doing, but if we were interested in anything at 
all, it was the genetic progress that they were making with the stock.”
62 .  21
 
The growth in the poultry industry in the decade or so after the decontrol of feedstuffs 
was truly impressive. Total commercial broiler chicken production grew from a near 
insignificant one million in 1950, to five million by 1953, or perhaps one-eighth of the 
egg-laying population. But after the summer of 1953 growth was truly remarkable, the 
table poultry population rising to ten million shortly after 1956, and 100 million by 
1961, and well over 150 million by 1965-6. By 1967 the total number of birds 
produced for table poultry in Britain was 202 million, compared with only 52 million 
egg-layers.
63 This explosive growth in the size of the chicken industry was associated 
with no less a dramatic concentration, with, by 1963, 90 percent of the entire chicken 
production “in the hands of only 1,000 growers”, each either owned by, or contracting 
with only a few dozen processors.
64 At the top of the industry were Sainsbury’s and 
MacFisheries in retailing, and Buxted and Lloyd Maunder in production and 
processing. Together these firms had captured around one third of the total market 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, albeit at different stages.
65  
 
Such concentration had yielded tremendous gains in efficiency, which allowed the 
price to fall.
66 In 1954 Sainsbury’s were selling their roasters for 4s per lb or more, 
which for a 4lb bird placed a chicken firmly in the luxury price category.
67 Hall and 
Clark show how chicken prices fell by 30 per cent from 1955 to 1965, compared with 
pork and lamb prices rising by between 20 to 30 percent, and beef prices by over 40 
percent over the same period.
68 And as prices fell, so demand for chicken soared. 
British meat consumption overall was broadly static after 1953. So the share going to 
poultry rose from only one percent in 1955 to ten percent by 1965. Once the idea of 
chicken consumption gained credence with the British public, they switched to .  22
poultry in ever greater numbers. Poultry consumption represented almost a quarter of 




VI. Conclusion  
Within ten years of the Poultry Farmer heralding the decontrol of feedstuffs, the 
British poultry industry had been transformed from an agricultural backwater into one 
of the most dynamic sectors of the British economy. In 1964 Buxted was processing 
over 500,000 birds per week at its three processing plants.
70 This transformation was 
dependent upon a series of critical innovations: in poultry breed selection and 
reproduction techniques at commercial hatcheries; in nutrition, growth management 
and disease control, especially through exploiting developments in pharmaceutical 
technologies; in the accommodation of ever larger flocks, their feeding, ventilating, 
and in the control of their behaviour; in their slaughtering and processing, with the 
enormous investments in refrigeration throughout the distribution channels, and the 
ever more widespread use of antibiotics; in retailing, where the emergence of 
supermarkets and the self-service format prompted so many of these changes in the 
supply chain; and finally in cooking, where families by the million took first to 
roasting chickens with greater regularity, and then frying, baking, and grilling in their 
experimentation with new culinary tastes.  
 
Yet all of these innovations originated in the United States, where all of the 
advantages of scale and access to investment finance in the 1950s lay. Even self-
service techniques originated there, and were widely adopted by retailers of chicken. 
Despite this, British producers were able to catch up and even, in many areas, .  23
overtake the American producers by the mid-1960s. To a very large extent this was 
because the institutional structure of the British industry differed significantly from 
that in the U.S.  
 
It was the co-ordinating role played by a few leading food retailers that enabled 
efficiency levels to rise so quickly in the British industry. Sainsbury was committed to 
introducing self-service techniques into its chain of stores from the late 1950s, while 
still retaining its traditional commitment to poultry. It was only after realizing the 
possibilities that arose from introducing American methods in processing that 
Sainsbury’s then organised the industry by allocating regional sectors to its privileged 
suppliers, who then had to go ensure supplies came from their local farmers. This, the 
“group system”, was an echo of wartime practice and yet it was superbly successful in 
peacetime competitive markets because it allowed the British industry to avoid the 
volatility associated with the U.S. model. The lack of co-ordination there meant that 
the market for chicken initially oscillated between periods of glut and scarcity before 
consolidation occurred. Instead, in Britain, the market was created for frozen, not 
fresh, chicken, so perishability was reduced. Co-ordination around this frozen chicken 
enabled a stable market to be created very early. Revenues then became far more 
predictable, so prompting higher rates of investment in advanced mechanisation, and, 
with the guaranteed sales, high rates of utilisation across all new capital equipment 
from the outset. It provided an institutional structure that enabled scarce investment to 
be used very efficiently, and so encouraged rapid growth.  
 
The British model was based on collaborative relationships along the supply chain 
instigated and controlled by retailers. This was absent in the U.S. The American .  24
preference for “arm’s length” contracts even to the 1980s bemused John Maunder. In 
a sector where quality assurance was of paramount importance in guaranteeing 
product quality to the consumers, the British model was to opt for the organisation 
closest to consumers, the leading retailers, to be the principal co-ordinator. The 
American model largely left such co-ordination to the relevant Government 
department and the firms with the deepest pockets, best able to survive the industry’s 
periodic downturns and drive consolidation through. In Britain, instead of the 
proactive role of the USDA, the Government was essentially broadly protectionist, but 
uninterested in pursuing any interventionist policies that might have helped to 
encourage modernization of poultry production. Indeed, their protectionist measures 
hindered innovation in the closely related egg sector, permitting archaic production 
and distribution methods to continue unchallenged.  
  
The British model eventually changed, and became somewhat less integrated, 
although food retailers still carry far more influence there today than in the United 
States. But the significance of the remarkable British poultry industry experiment was 
to have important repercussions for the country’s leading food retailers for many 
years afterwards. Of all the supermarket pioneers, Sainsbury’s emerged as the market 
leader in the early 1960s and increased its dominance during the 1980s because of the 
importance of learning how to innovate using such strongly collaborative 
relationships with its supply chain. .  25
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